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THE FEDERAL-STATE CORPORATE LAW
RELATIONSHIP-A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR
SELIGMAN'S CALL FOR FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF
STATE CORPORATE FIDUCIARY LAW
William T. Quillen*
INTRODUCTION
Claiming that state law changes in recent years have
emasculated both the substance and enforcement of the fidu-
ciary duties of care and loyalty, Professor Seligman argues
that "sufficient evidence has accumulated to justify possible
congressional action" to impose upon public companies a new
set of federal fiduciary duty standards in place of those pres-
ently existing under state law.' Further, Professor Seligman,
in a none-too-subtle swipe at the performance of state courts,
would have such newly-created federal causes of action litigat-
ed in the federal courts and he would expressly prohibit federal
courts from deferring to special litigation committees in suits
properly alleging misconduct of any member of a corporation's
board of directors.2 Professor Seligman's call for partial federal
preemption of state corporate law through the introduction of
federal minimum standards is by no means new. For example,
in 1976, Professor Seligman, Ralph Nader and Mark Green
spearheaded an unsuccessful effort to promote federal charter-
ing for major U.S. corporations.'
This Article suggests that, contrary to Professor
Former Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery; retired Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court; Secretary of State of Delaware and Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Law at the Widener University School of Law. Justice Quillen
expresses his appreciation to A. Gilchrist Sparks, HI and William M. Lafferty of
the Delaware Bar for invaluable assistance in the preparation of this response.
' Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 61 (1993).
2 Id. at 61.
3 RALPH NADER ET AL., TAiING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); see also Wil-
liam L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974).
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Seligman's thesis, there has been no failure in the state law
development and enforcement of fiduciary duties since that
time to justify the radical step he readvocates now.4 Indeed,
the climate of our times-federal deficits, corporate downsiz-
ing, volatile profit and loss margins and global competi-
tion-makes Professor Seligman's renewed advocacy peculiarly
dated.
The premise underlying Professor Seligman's proposal is
that both substantively and procedurally the state law fiducia-
ry duties of care and loyalty are no longer sufficient to protect
the interests of stockholders.5 That premise is incorrect. As
this Article will demonstrate, the examples cited by Professor
Seligman as establishing a need for federal preemption in
reality do no such thing. In fact, the "decline" witnessed by
Professor Seligman's arguments frequently lack any real-world
starting point and often reflect isolated instances that have
heightened judicial scrutiny. On a more positive note, this
Article posits that, since the United States Supreme Court's
landmark decision in 1977 in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green,6 a healthy partnership has developed between the state
and federal systems whereby federal disclosure law, enforced
in the federal courts, has forced into the open both the facts
with respect to corporate transactions and the extent to which
the decisionmaking process might be infected by a possible
conflict of interest. Thus, stockholders who are armed with
specific facts are able to prosecute effectively meritorious
claims for breaches of the duty of loyalty under state law in
state courts. To the extent that Professor Seligman insists that
transactions not involving a conflict of interest on the part of a
board majority should nonetheless be subject to an entire fair-
ness standard of judicial scrutiny7 or that state law should be
altered to facilitate an increase in derivative litigation based
solely upon alleged violations of the fiduciary duty of care,8 his
arguments lack merit.
Part I of this Article analyzes and refutes Professor
Seligman's flawed hypothesis that there has been a decline in
4 Seligman, supra note 1, at 61.
" Id. at 36.
6 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
See Seligman, supra note 1, at 13.
" Id. at 60.
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the state law fiduciary duty of loyalty. Part II next argues that
state law enforcement of the duty of care has increased, not
decreased, due in large part to the seminal case of Smith v.
Van Gorkom Rejecting Professor Seligman's theory, Part HI
argues that special litigation committees and the demand re-
quirement have neither hindered the enforcement of the duty
of loyalty nor led to a wholesale dismissal of meritorious deriv-
ative actions. Finally, Part IV concludes that state corporation
law, particularly Delaware's corporation law, has substantially
progressed and refined itself resulting in the continued, effec-
tive enforcement of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.
I. THERE HAS BEEN No DISCERNABLE DIMINUTION IN THE
STATE LAW DUTY OF LOYALTY
Professor Seligman advocates the partial federal preemp-
tion of state fiduciary law based upon a flawed hypothesis. He
asserts that there has been a decline in the state law fiduciary
duty of loyalty due to, among other reasons, Delaware courts
applying the business judgment rule in reviewing the adoption
of tender offer defenses by corporate boards, instead of the
application of a duty of loyalty analysis (i.e., the entire fairness
standard). But, quite to the contrary, there has been no decline
in the state law fiduciary duty of loyalty under Delaware law
in the arena of tender offer defenses or otherwise. Rather, the
duty of loyalty rule as stated in the seminal Delaware case of
Guth v. Loft, Inc.'° is still a guiding principle of Delaware cor-
porate law today:1'
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their
position of trust and confidence to further their private interests.
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
" 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). It is similarly inaccurate to suggest that state corpo-
rate law has failed in the insider trading and corporate suffrage areas. See, e.g.,
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971); Brophy v. Cities
Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949).
" See, e.g., Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 954 (Del. 1992); Mills
Acquis. Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989); Ivanhoe Partners
v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del.
1984); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Grand Metro. Pub.
Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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While technically not trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to
the corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing
through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of hu-
man characteristics and motives, has established a rule that de-
mands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexora-
bly, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirma-
tively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his
charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work
injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage
which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it
to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The
rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corpora-
tion demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-
interest. 2
Professor Seligman's characterization of the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co.'" as a step backward in state law enforcement of the fidu-
ciary duty of loyalty is similarly misguided. 4 Unocal, far from
being a step backward and contributing to the decline of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty, was actually a step in the direction
Professor Seligman advocates; that is, the application of a
heightened standard of review by courts when reviewing the
adoption of defensive measures by corporate boards in the face
of unsolicited tender offers.
Although there were no Delaware cases directly on point,
several federal courts applying Delaware law prior to Unocal
have held that the business judgment rule applied to the deci-
sion by a board to adopt defensive measures to thwart or im-
pede a hostile takeover. In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme
Court had to decide the validity of a corporation's tender offer
for its own shares, which excluded from participation a stock-
holder making a hostile tender offer for the corporation's stock.
While the court reaffirmed that the business judgment rule is
applicable in the context of a hostile takeover, it held that due
12 Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
13 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
' Seligman, supra note .1, at 21.
15 See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295-97 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). Professor Seligman, on the other
hand, would have any potential loyalty factor in a takeover context treated the
same way as an interested CEO's vote on his or her own executive compensation;
these two situations, though, are very different. See Seligman, supra note 1, at 9.
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to "the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primar-
ily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation
and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for
judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of
the business judgment rule may be conferred."16
First, the supreme court held that in order for the busi-
ness judgment rule to apply, "directors must show that they
had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corpo-
rate policy and effectiveness existed because of another
person's stock ownership" 7 and that such a showing "is mate-
rially enhanced... by the approval of a board comprised of a
majority of outside independent directors who have acted in ac-
cordance with the foregoing standards."8 Significantly, in es-
tablishing the first prong of its enhanced duty analysis, the
Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed Guth's basic principal
"that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the
best interests of the corporation's stockholders."' 9 In this re-
gard, the court noted, in adopting a defensive measure to
thwart or impede a takeover, "the directors may not have acted
solely or primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in
office"2" and the defensive measure implemented by the direc-
tors must be "motivated by a good-faith concern for the welfare
of the corporation and its stockholders, which in all circum-
stances must be free of any fraud or other misconduct."2
As a second prerequisite to the application of the business
judgment rule, the court held that directors must establish
that the defensive measure is balanced-that is, "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed."22 Thus, to satisfy the balance
element, the directors must analyze the nature of the takeover
bid and its effect on the corporate enterprises including
inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, ques-
tions of illegality, the impact on "constituencies" other than share-
holders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the
" Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 955 (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964)).
18 Id.
" Id. (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).
20 Id. (citing Cheff, 199 A.2d at 556 and Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 140
(Del. Ch. 1960)).
21 Id. (citing Cheff, 199 A.2d at 554-55).
2 Id.
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community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality
of securities being offered in the exchange .... While not a control-
ling factor, it also seems to us that a board may reasonably consider
the basic stockholder interests at stake, including those of short
term speculators, whose actions may have fueled the coercive aspect
of the offer at the expense of the long term investor.'
Thus, only if the directors adopting a defensive measure in the
face of a hostile tender offer first satisfy their enhanced, two-
pronged duty of showing that they had reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed (which decision, as a practical matter, must be made by
a majority of independent directors in order to be respected)
and, second, that the defensive measure was reasonable in
relationship to the threat posed, are they entitled to the
protections of the business judgment rule. Otherwise, the di-
rectors will have the burden of showing that the defensive
measure was entirely fair. Unocal thus imposed greater, not
lesser, burdens on directors than were widely perceived to exist
before.
In a further effort to support his theory that there has
been a decline in the state law's protection of stockholders'
interests, Professor Seligman misplaces reliance on the "other
constituencies"24 language in Unocal, arguing that a broad
reading of Unocal would sanction director action that was
taken against the interests of stockholders and that "[i]f this
language were construed broadly, it would be revolutionary in
its significance."25 However, as Professor Seligman grudgingly
concedes, "There is good reason to doubt that the Delaware
Supreme Court intended so broad a meaning".26
In fact, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.,27 the Delaware Supreme Court specifically narrowed the
"other constituencies" language in UnocalY The court, while
generally reaffirming the principles underlying its Unocal
decision, struck down the lock-up option, break-up fee, and "no-
shop" provisions adopted by Revlon to put an end to an ongo-
2' Id. at 955-56 (footnote omitted).
24 See id. at 955.
2 Seligman, supra note 1, at 18.
26 Id. at 18.
- 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
Id. at 182.
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ing auction.2" The court held that once the target's board had
determined to sell the company, "[tihe directors' role changed
from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company."0
While acknowledging that lock-up options were not per se
illegal under Delaware law, the court concluded that the
Revlon board's emphasis on shoring up the sagging market
value of certain outstanding notes was inconsistent with its
primary responsibility to stockholders.3 ' Importantly, the
court rejected Revlon's argument that, under the "other con-
stituencies" language in Unocal, it could appropriately consider
the interests of noteholders in determining to favor one bidder
over another:
The Revlon board argued that it acted in good faith in protect-
ing the noteholders because Unocal permits consideration of other
corporate constituencies. Although such considerations may be per-
missible, there are fundamental limitations upon that prerogative. A
board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accru-
ing to the stockholders .... However, such concern for non-stock-
holder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active
bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or main-
tain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon adopted two
significant limitations3 3 on the discretion of a board to con-
sider the interests of "other constituencies" in adopting a de-
fensive measure to thwart or impede a takeover bid: (1) when
2" Id. at 180-87.
' As the Delaware Supreme Court noted, when it became apparent that "the
break-up of the company was inevitable," the duty of Revlon's board "changed from
the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the
company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit." Id. at 182.
31 Id. at 182-83.
' Id. at 182 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court then affirmed the
lower court injunction against the lock-up option and break-up fee, stating that
"when a board ends an intense bidding contest on an insubstantial basis, and
where a significant by-product of that action is to protect the directors against a
perceived threat of personal liability," the action cannot withstand the heightened
scrutiny under Unocal. Id. at 184.
' Professor Seligman, by contrast, believes that Revlon adopted only one limi-
tation on a board's discretion to consider "other" constituencies. See Seligman,
supra note 1, at 20.
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an auction among active bidders is in progress and the goal is
no longer to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to
sell it to the highest bidder, a board cannot consider the "other
constituencies" noted in Unocal, but instead must focus solely
upon the maximization of shareholder value; and (2) in other
circumstances, a board may consider "other constituencies" in
fulfilling its responsibilities, "provided there are rationally
related benefits accruing to the stockholders."' These limita-
tions make it clear that the consideration of "other constituen-
cies" will not "unhinge directors" of Delaware corporations
from their duty of loyalty to shareholders as Professor
Seligman suggests.35
It is also significant that Delaware has resisted any temp-
tation to adopt legislation diluting the fiduciary duty of loyalty
owed by directors to stockholders, refusing to follow the lead of
at least twenty-five other states that have enacted "other con-
stituency" statutes.36 Such statutes explicitly permit-and in
at least one case require-the board of any corporation char-
tered in the state to consider, in discharging its duties, the
interests of groups other than stockholders.37 Under Revlon,
however, directors in Delaware may only consider "other con-
stituencies" if there "are rationally related benefits accruing to
the stockholders."" Professor Seligman simply fails to ac-
knowledge that Delaware's approach actually enhances the
duty of loyalty owed by directors to stockholders instead of
detracting from it: it allows for consideration of "other constitu-
encies" only if there will be benefits accruing to the company's
stockholders from doing so.
To support further his claim that state law has ceased to
Id. at 182.
Seligman, supra note 1, at 20.
' As at least one author has noted:
Perhaps the most surprising fact in the emergence of these statutes
in so many states in only a few years is the almost total lack of any
considered deliberation concerning this legislation. Typically, these stat-
utes have been hustled through the state legislatures by business and
bar groups determined to add as many weapons as possible to the anti-
takeover arsenal.
James J. Hanks, Jr., Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes: An Idea Whose Time
Should Never Have Come, 3:12 INSIGHTS at 20 (Dec. 1989).
37 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West 1992).
' Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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function to protect stockholders from breaches of the duty of
loyalty, Professor Seligman makes passing reference to two
cases in which a fiduciary duty breach was not established,
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.9 and Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.4" He ignores, however,
those cases decided after Revlon in which the Delaware courts
have taken swift action to remedy breaches of the duty of loy-
alty and to assure that stockholder interests are adequately
protected.4 In Ivanhoe Partners the Delaware Supreme Court
held that the obligation under Revlon to maximize short-term
values did not arise because the sale of Newmont was not
"inevitable," even though Newmont had facilitated the pur-
chase by Gold Fields-a twenty-six percent stockholder-of
additional shares such that Gold Fields eventually became a
49.7% stockholder.42 A critical fact in the court's holding,
which Professor Seligman's analysis ignores, is that Newmont's
Board had negotiated a standstill agreement with Gold Fields
requiring that control of the Board remain with the public
stockholders.43 Similarly, in attacking the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Paramount, Professor Seligman makes no
reference to the massive factual record before the court estab-
lishing that the business judgment to combine Time and
Warner had been based on years of careful study and had been
made before any takeover pressure had been brought to bear
upon either board.'
In yet another effort to establish his "race-to-the-bottom"
thesis, Professor Seligman expresses displeasure with "'pre-
planned defensive mechanisms' such as the poison pill" and
questions how such measures "could be more difficult to justify
when the terms of a potential tender offer were unknown."4
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,46 the Delaware
3 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
40 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
"' See, e.g., In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., 564 A.2d 342 (Del.
Ch. 1989); Mills Acquis. Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); Tate &
Lyle Pub. v. Staley Continental, Inc., No. 9813, 1988 WL 46064 (Del. Ch. May 9,
1988).
4" Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A-2d at 1345.
4' Id. at 1343.
4 Id. at 1153-54.
Seligman, supra note 1, at 22.
4' 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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Supreme Court validated the adoption of a poison pill mecha-
nism to ward off possible future advances. After finding the
Unocal analysis to be applicable, the court held that
Household's directors were protected by the business judgment
rule in adopting the poison pill since the decision to adopt it
was informed, undertaken in good faith and reasonable in
relation to the general threat posed. However, in a holding
completely responsive to Professor Seligman's rhetorical ques-
tion, the court emphasized that when and if Household's Board
had been faced with a request by a potential acquiror to re-
deem the poison pill, it would have been required to determine
whether or not the rights should be redeemed. That determina-
tion would have been subjected to the Unocal standard.48
Since Moran, Delaware cases involving poison pills have
focused on situations where a board was faced with deciding
whether or not to redeem its company's poison pill in the face
of a pending hostile tender offer.49 While a number of Dela-
ware cases have validated board decisions to keep their respec-
tive company's poison pills in place, Delaware courts have also
ordered that they must be redeemed when there is no longer
any valid corporate purpose served by maintaining them."°
Moreover, Delaware courts have also ordered that rights be
redeemed under Unocal when keeping them in place is no
longer reasonable in relation to any threat posed by the hostile
bid.8 ' Courts have also recognized that poison pills have been
47 Id. at 1357.
4 Id. at 1354.
" See, e.g., BNS Inc. v. Koppers, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988); In re
Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 10350, 1988 WL 143010 (Del. Ch. Dec.
30, 1988); MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., C.A. No. 10428, 1988
WL 140221 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988); Doskocil Cos., Inc. v. Griggy, No. 10095, 1988
WL 105751 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988); Nomad Acquis. Corp. v. Damon Corp., Nos.
10173, 10189, 1988 WL 96192 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 1988); Tate & Lyle, Pub. v.
Staley Continental, Inc., No. 9813, 1988 WL 46064 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988); Facet
Enter., Inc. v. Prospect Group, Inc., No. 9746, 1988 WL 36140 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10,
1988).
o See, e.g., Mills Acquis. Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., No. 10168, 1988 WL 108332
(Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).
"1 See, e.g., Grand Metro. Pub. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(ordering Pillsbury to redeem its rights plan because the court found the continu-
ation of the rights plan to be a "Draconian" response to Grand Met's all-cash, all-
shares bid); City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787
(Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that a board was not justified in refusing to redeem
rights at the end of an auction where the final bids resulting from the auction
[Vol. 59: 107
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effective in securing higher acquisition prices for stockhold-
ers.52 Thus, Professor Seligman's misgivings about pre-
planned defensive measures are misguided, since they also
must be scrutinized under the enhanced Unocal standard and
in light of their pragmatic results.
As the cases referred to above demonstrate, there has been
no decline in the enforcement of the duty of loyalty-at least
under Delaware law, particularly in the area of tender offer
defenses. To the contrary, the heightened standard established
in Unocal has led to increased, not decreased, scrutiny of ten-
der offer defenses. Moreover, it is clear that under Delaware
law the interests of "other constituencies" in the context of
adopting a defensive measure may be considered only if "there
are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders."53
Thus, even in the maelstrom posed by the fierce debate in the
1980s over whether tender offers were good or bad, the Dela-
ware courts adapted and were able to develop rational ap-
proaches to the continued enforcement of the fiduciary duty of
loyalty first espoused in Guth.
II. STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OF THE DUTY OF CARE HAS
INCREASED, NOT DECREASED
It is truly astonishing that Professor Seligman, whose
article attacks Delaware law in advocating his tired "race-to-
the-bottom" thesis, pays so little attention to what is likely the
most celebrated duty of care case in history--Smith v. Van
Gorkom.' Prior to that decision the common wisdom was
that, as a practical matter, directors of non-financial institu-
tions were immune from personal liability for duty of care
violations. Far from leading to a decline in the duty of care, as
Professor Seligman argues, 5 the Van Gorkom decision and its
aftermath led to heightened awareness and enforcement of the
were so close that one bid could not reasonably be said to be superior to the oth-
er).
2 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
181 (Del. 1985). City Capital, 551 A.2d at 797-98; see also CRTF v. Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
' Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
r4 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
' Seligman, supra note 1, at 57.
19931
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
duty of care, and undoubtedly has raised the level of perfor-
mance of corporate directors.
In 1985 the Delaware Supreme Court in Van Gorkom
imposed liability upon the directors of Trans Union for conduct
that to many seemed wholly undeserving of the characteriza-
tion "gross negligence." In a 3-2 decision, the court reversed
the Chancellor and found gross negligence in the directors'
process of evaluating and approving the sale of their corpora-
tion at a premium to an unrelated third party.56 The court
found that the sale was effected with insufficient exploration of
either the underlying factual framework or the available alter-
natives. Specifically, the court held that the plaintiff had suc-
cessfully demonstrated that the directors' decision was unin-
formed, thereby rebutting the presumption that their business
judgment was an informed one.57 Thus, the directors of Trans
Union, in a decision supported by only three of the six judges
who considered the case, were denied the protection of the
business judgment rule and were held personally liable for any
damages resulting from their actions, even though there were
no allegations of self-dealing."
Not surprisingly, the Van Gorkom decision sent shock
waves through the corporate world and provoked much harsh
criticism. 9 Nevertheless, far from detracting from the duty of
care, Van Gorkom focused national attention on it. Moreover,
Van Gorkom had the effect of raising the level of conduct in
corporate boardrooms across the country; it made directors
aware that a significant failure to become aware of material
facts before making a decision that subsequently resulted in
damage or loss to the corporation or its shareholders created a
significant risk that a court would impose personal liability
when conducting a post hoc review of the director's decision.
Van Gorkom also had the negative effect of discouraging
qualified outsiders from serving on corporate boards as inde-
"' Van Gorkan, 488 A.2d at 858.
57 Id. at 874.
Id. at 889, 893.
" See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans
Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437 (1985); William T. Quillen, Trans Union, Business
Judgment and Neutral Principles, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465 (1985); Arthur M.
Borden, First Thoughts on Decision in Delaware on Trans Union, N.Y. L.J., Feb.
25, 1985, at 1.
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pendent directors because the risk of personal liability for a
breach of the duty of care was not worth the reward of serving
on a corporate board.6" Moreover, this negative effect was ex-
acerbated by problems in the market for directors' and officers'
liability insurance, which appeared at about the same time."1
These concerns led to the enactment of section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law,62 which permits share-
holders of a Delaware corporation to amend their corporation's
certificate of incorporation prospectively to eliminate or limit
the personal liability of directors for money damages arising
from a breach of the duty of care.6" However, by the express
language of the statute, a section 102(b)(7) charter provision
cannot relieve directors of personal liability for:
(1) any breach of the duty of loyalty; (2) acts or omissions not in
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law; (3) any liability for declaration of unlawful divi-
dends or unlawful stock repurchases or redemptions; or (4) any
transaction from which a director received an improper personal
benefit.'
While suggesting that the advent of section 102(b)(7) and
similar statutes has caused a decline in the enforcement of the
duty of care,65 Professor Seligman provides no support for this
theory. Moreover, in advocating his position, he fails to point
out that such a charter provision can only be enacted by a
shareholder vote (except for new corporations), and he fails to
mention that section 102(b)(7) does not place challenged con-
duct beyond the scope of judicial review. In fact, section
102(b)(7) charter provisions pose no legal impediment to efforts
to obtain injunctive or other equitable relief (not involving
money damages) that may be sought to enforce the duty of
care. Absolutely contrary to Professor Seligman's argument,
section 102(b)(7) correctly emphasizes enforcement of the duty
of care at the injunction stage rather than at the damages
stage of litigation. Moreover, far from leading to a decline in
6 D. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 15.06[1],
at 15-30 (1993).
61 Id.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
6 Id.
4 Id.
' Seligman, supra note 1, at 50.
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the enforcement of the duty of care, Van Gorkom and its after-
math sent a strong signal that Delaware courts will closely
scrutinize allegations of directorial rubber-stamping of man-
agement recommendations. Similarly, after Van Gorkom the
failure of directors to insist upon adequate information and to
undertake an independent analysis of matters brought to their
boards will be viewed seriously by Delaware courts.
Finally, Professor Seligman's implicit call for more stock-
holder derivative litigation seeking money damages to enforce
the duty of care is misguided," particularly given the prob-
lems that corporations already face in finding qualified outside
directors who are willing to serve. The social utility of increas-
ing stockholder derivative suits against directors and their
insurers simply to enforce the duty of care is a dubious propo-
sition in and of itself, given the cost of such litigation and the
likelihood that it will simply be passed on indirectly to stock-
holders and consumers in the form of higher insurance premi-
ums. Moreover, society's need to resort to the duty of care
derivative suit as a tool to monitor management would appear
to be much less today than in 1976 when Professor Seligman
first argued for federal incorporation: 7 the increased strength
of large institutional stockholders and increased stockholder
activism in recent years makes it more likely that inept man-
agement will be forced out either at the ballot box or as the
result of indirect pressure from stockholders. In short, the
proper focus for enforcing the duty of care should be at the
injunction stage of litigation-usually the preliminary injunc-
tion stage-and at the ballot box. So viewed, the combination
of Van Gorkum and section 102(b)(7) is another example of the
state law naturally maturing to maximize fiduciary standards
while minimizing monitoring costs.
III. THE EVOLVING SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND DEMAND
PROCEDURES UNDER STATE LAW ALSO Do NOT JUSTIFY
THE RADICAL SOLUTION PROPOSED
Professor Seligman further hypothesizes that another
explanation for the purported decline in state law fiduciary
' See, Seligman, supra note 1, at 60.
67 See NADER ET AL., supra note 3.
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duty concepts during the past thirty years is the evolution of
certain procedures for the termination of stockholder derivative
actions, including the use of special litigation committees and,
more specifically, the demand requirement.68 Once again, both
Professor Seligman's theory and analysis are unsupported by
the facts and the law.
A. Special Litigation Committees
As Professor Seligman recognizes, in Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado69 the Delaware Supreme Court adopted a middle
ground for reviewing the recommendations of a special litiga-
tion committee. Zapata created a new procedural and substan-
tive framework for cases in which a special litigation commit-
tee seeks to take control of or dismiss derivative litigation on
the grounds that the action is non-meritorious or that, even if
possibly meritorious, continued prosecution would be detrimen-
tal to the best interests of the corporation." However, far
from making it easy for directors to dismiss derivative litiga-
tion based upon the recommendation of a special litigation
committee, the hurdles that must be cleared under the two-
step approach set forth in Zapata are prodigious.
First, in reviewing the recommendation of a special litiga-
tion committee to dismiss a derivative action, the trial court,
must "inquire into the independence and good faith of the
committee and the bases supporting its conclusions."7 Limit-
ed discovery may be ordered by the trial court to facilitate such
inquiries and the corporation bears the burden of establishing
See Seligman, supra note 1, at 23-25.
€9 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
To As Professor Seligman notes, prior to Zapata, courts confronting motions to
dismiss based upon recommendations of special litigation committees had reacted
differently. Several courts outside of Delaware had interpreted Delaware law as
permitting dismissal whenever the court was satisfied that a committee was in
fact wholly independent and financially disinterested, and that the committee had
made a reasonable investigation. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d
724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F.
Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982);
Siegal v. Merrick, 84 F.R.D. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,
419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
7' Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788.
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independence, good faith and reasonable investigation.72 If the
trial court finds that: (1) the corporation has not carried its
burden of establishing the committee's independence and good
faith; (2) that it has not shown reasonable bases for its conclu-
sions; or (3) "if the Court is not satisfied for other reasons
relating to the process, including but not limited to the good
faith of the committee, the Court shall deny the corporation's
motion."73
Only if the trial court is satisfied that the corporation has
carried its burdens under Chancery Court Rule 56 (which is
identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56) standards may
it then proceed "in its discretion, to the next step."74 If the
court does proceed to the second step, it must apply "its own
independent business judgment" in determining whether the
motion to dismiss should be granted, and not defer to the busi-
ness judgment of the special litigation committee.75 As the
Zapata court noted, "[t]his means, of course, that instances
could arise where a committee can establish its independence
and sound bases for its good faith decisions and still have the
corporation's motion denied."76 This second step was "intended
to thwart instances where corporate actions meet the criteria
of step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit,
or where corporate actions would simply prematurely termi-
nate a stockholder grievance deserving of further consideration
in the corporation's interest."77
With the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that one factor
not appreciated by the Zapata decision is that the objective of
a special litigation committee's recommendation to dismiss a
derivative action is, in most cases, to save expenses by cutting
short frivolous litigation. Kaplan v. Wyatt,78 the first reported
decision in which the Zapata procedures were utilized, high-
lighted this point. In Kaplan, Chancellor Brown described in
detail the intracorporate and judicial proceedings mandated
under Zapata and expressed his view that the Zapata proce-
72 Id.
73 Id. at 789.
71 Id. (emphasis added).
7 Id. (emphasis added).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984), affd, 499 A.2d 1184 (Del. 1985).
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dures were "fraught with practical complications at the trial
court level" that would neither lead to the speedy resolution of
derivative actions nor reduce the expense of such litigation. 9
Shortly after Chancellor Brown's opinion in Kaplan,
Zapata's special litigation committee procedure was again
tested in Lewis v. Fuqua.8" In Fuqua, the plaintiff alleged
that a majority of Fuqua's directors had diverted a corporate
opportunity to themselves by purchasing common stock of a
company which Fuqua was acquiring through purchase of that
company's preferred stock."' The Fuqua board appointed Ter-
ry Sanford, the President of Duke University (and also the
former governor of North Carolina), as the sole member of a
special litigation committee, to be assisted by outside coun-
sel.82 After what the court expressly found to be adequate in-
vestigation, the one-man special litigation committee recom-
mended that the derivative action not be pursued.'
The court of chancery, however, refused to dismiss the
action, based on three independent grounds. First, the court
found that the corporation had not carried its burden of estab-
lishing that the special litigation committee was independent.
It noted that the committee member, who had been on the
board at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, had been named
as a defendant and that he had numerous political and finan-
cial dealings with Fuqua's chief executive." Next, the court
found that the committee's legal analysis of plaintiffs claims
did not have a reasonable basis.' Finally, the court applied
its own independent business judgment and determined that
the action should not be dismissed.86
Since the decision in Fuqua, there do not appear to be any
reported dismissals of stockholder derivative actions under
7' Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 509-10.
80 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985), appeal denied, 504 A.2d 571 (Del. 1986). Curi-
ously, Professor Seligman relegates this case to treatment in a footnote. See
Seligman, supra note 1 at 34 n.140.
"' Fuqua, 502 A.2d at 964.
"2Id. at 965.
' Id. at 967.
' Id. at 966-67. The financial dealings were not with Governor Sanford person-
ally. Instead, what concerned the court was that J. B. Fuqua had made a major
contribution to Duke University when Sanford was President. Id.
Id. at 967.
Id. at 971-72.
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Zapata's special litigation committee procedures, nor do there
appear to be any pending cases involving the review of a spe-
cial litigation committee's recommendation to dismiss a
stockholder derivative action. Further, members of the practic-
ing bar advise that, since Fuqua, few if any corporations have
availed themselves of the Zapata procedure.17 It is not sur-
prising that Zapata's special litigation committee procedure
has fallen into disuse since Fuqua, given the very real prospect
that a corporation might appoint a special litigation committee,
prepare a thorough report at great time and expense and have
that report serve as the blueprint for plaintiffs continued pros-
ecution of the litigation, rather than as the basis for its dis-
missal. This discarded procedure can hardly qualify as a "fun-
damental explanation for the decline of the state corporate law
duty of loyalty."88
Thus, in light of the significant burdens placed upon a
corporation relying on the recommendation of a special litiga-
tion committee to dismiss derivative litigation under Zapata,
and the fact that the special litigation committee procedures
have not been widely used, Professor Seligman's hypothesis
that the special litigation committee procedures have somehow
hindered the enforcement of the duty of loyalty in any material
way is unfounded.
B. The Demand Requirement
In the same breath, Professor Seligman then attacks the
substantive demand requirement89 without acknowledging
"' Moreover, in light of the decision in Fuqua, it is apparent that the Court of
Chancery will take an active role in reviewing recommendations of special litiga-
tion committees to dismiss derivative litigation, and that given the broad discre-
tion vested in the Court of Chancery by the Supreme Court in Zapata, it is un-
likely that a decision rejecting a special litigation committee recommendation will
be reversed on appeal.
Seligman, supra note 1, at 23.
The "demand requirement" refers to the legal requirement that prior to insti-
tuting a derivative action, a stockholder must first make a demand on the board
of directors that it bring suit on behalf of the corporation unless the making of
such a demand is excused as futile. This substantive requirement is embodied in
Chancery Court Rule 23.1, which requires a derivative plaintiff to allege with par-
ticularity the efforts, if any, that he made to obtain such action from the directors
and why those efforts failed or, alternatively, why no such efforts were made. DEL.
CH. CT. R. 23.1.
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that the demand issues involve a completely separate line of
cases. Professor Seligman's theory that the demand require-
ment and the case law that has developed thereunder have
somehow led to a material decline in the enforcement of the
duty of loyalty is wholly unsupported.
For a number of years the demand requirement lan-
guished, but with a series of cases beginning with the 1984
decision in Aronson v. Lewis,90 the Delaware Supreme Court
breathed new life into it. In Aronson the complaint named all
of the directors as defendants and challenged as wasteful an
allegedly excessive employment agreement granted to a forty-
nine percent stockholder.9 Reversing the court of chancery's
finding of demand futility, the Delaware Supreme Court reject-
ed the plaintiffs allegations as insufficient under Chancery
Court Rule 23.192 and enunciated a two-part test for deter-
mining demand futility. In order for a complaint to withstand
a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss for failure to make demand, a
complaint must allege with particularity, facts creating a rea-
sonable doubt that "(1) the directors are disinterested and
independent, and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise
the product of a valid exercise of business judgment."93 The
court analyzed the first prong in terms of interested director
transactions and held that if a derivative complaint set forth
facts that, if true, would show that a majority of the directors
had personally profited from a challenged transaction or was
dominated by someone who had, demand would be futile.94
With respect to the second prong, the court held that "the mere
threat of personal liability for approving a questioned transac-
tion, standing alone," is insufficient to disqualify a board from
considering a demand. For one tempted to overread the practi-
cal import of this decision, it is significant to note that the
plaintiff in Aronson merely amended the complaint and
marched onward with the case.
Levine v. Smith95 may have marked a high watermark for
the defense in the demand line of cases. The Delaware Su-
473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
91 Id. at 808.
92 See supra note 90.
93 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
94 Id. at 815.
" 591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991).
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preme Court, in affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs' second
amended complaint found, among other things, that plaintiffs
had failed to meet their burden of pleading particularized facts
sufficient to support a claim of demand futility based on a lack
of independence of General Motors' outside directors, or suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption that General Motor's buyback of
stock from Ross Perot was the product of a valid exercise of
business judgment.96 The court in Levine restated that it
would apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review in such
demand futility cases and held that the Court of Chancery's
findings were supported by the record and, thus, did not con-
stitute an abuse of discretion.97
A strict reading of the foregoing cases might suggest that
it has become difficult, if not impossible, to allege successfully
demand futility. On the contrary, however, since the 1991
decision in Levine, there have been a number of decisions
where Delaware's Court of Chancery has excused stockholders
from making a demand." For example, in Abajian v. Kenne-
dy,99 Chancellor William T. Allen, while emphasizing the
highly discretionary nature of the "reasonable doubt" determi-
nation set forth in Aronson and its progeny, denied defendants'
motion to dismiss for failure to make demand, concluding that
the facts alleged in the amended complaint were "sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt concerning the availability of the
business judgment rule protections.""0 Similarly, in In re
Chrysler Corp. Shareholders Litigation,' Vice Chancellor
Jack B. Jacobs found that the entrenchment claims in the
complaint contained particularized facts sufficient to allege
that the directors were motivated solely or primarily by en-
trenchment concerns, thereby creating a reasonable doubt that
' Id. at 208.
97 Id. at 207.
98 See, e.g., In re Chrysler Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 11873, 1992 WL
181024 (Del. Ch. July 27, 1992); Boeing Co. v. Shrontz, No. 11273, 1992 WL
81228 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 1992); Chrysogelos v. London, No. 11910, 1992 WL 58516
(Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 1992); Andreae v. Andreae, No. 11905, 1992 WL 43924 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 5, 1992); Abajian v. Kennedy, No. 11425, 1992 WL 8794 (Del. Ch. Jan.
17, 1992); Kells-Murphy v. McNiff, No. 11009, 1991 WL 137143 (Del. Ch. July 12,
1991); Thorpe v. Cerbco, Inc., 611 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1991).
No. 11425, 1992 WL 8794 (Del. Ch. Jan. 17, 1992).
108 Abajian, No. 11425, 1992 WL 8794, at *1.
'0' No. 11873, 1992 WL 181024 (Del. Ch. July 27, 1992).
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they were disinterested when they adopted the amendments
that lowered the trigger on the corporation's rights plan.
10 2
Continuing the spate of recent cases excusing demand, the
most recent pronouncement from the Delaware Supreme Court
is Heineman v. Datapoint Corp. °3 In Heineman, the court re-
versed as an abuse of discretion the decision of the court of
chancery, which dismissed the plaintiffs amended complaint
for failure to allege with particularity facts sufficient to excuse
demand. While reaffirming the principles in Aronson and Le-
vine with respect to the pertinent legal standards, the court
emphasized that the court of chancery's decision under those
principles "involves essentially a discretionary ruling on a pre-
dominantly factual issue."04 Thus, in reviewing the court of
chancery's decision, the supreme court separately analyzed all
four of the transactions challenged in the complaint under the
abuse of discretion standard. It rebuked the lower court for
giving "conclusory treatment" to the claims in the complaint
and for not analyzing them separately."5 The court went on
to find that, with respect to two of the transactions at issue,
the plaintiff had alleged "sufficient facts of apparent self-deal-
ing to raise a reasonable doubt concerning director disinter-
est." °6 With respect to two other transactions at issue, the
court gave the benefit of the doubt to the plaintiff and refused
to affirm the dismissal of the claims even though the court
conceded that it was "at least arguable" that the factual allega-
tions underlying the claims were inadequate. 07 Instead, the
court gave the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint with re-
spect to those claims.'
Contrary to Professor Seligman's hypothesis, these recent
Delaware cases suggest that the demand requirement has not
undermined the enforcement of the duty of loyalty and has not
led to a wholesale dismissal of meritorious derivative actions.
Instead, with thoughtful application, the demand requirement
appears to be evolving into a sensitive device for sorting out
2 Id. at *45.
ic 611 A.2d 950 (Del. 1992).
,04 Id. at 952 (quoting Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988)).
'o Id. at 953.
Id.
7 Id. at 955.
8 Id. at 956.
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frivolous claims at an early stage in litigation."9 To cut off
such developments in the law by preempting them with federal
statutes would seem short-sighted at best.
CONCLUSION
Far from stultifying or backsliding since the last serious
call for federal preemption, state corporation law-and particu-
larly Delaware's corporate law-has progressed and refined
itself in ways that have resulted in the continued enforcement
of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to protect the inter-
ests of stockholders. State corporate law also continues to al-
low boards of directors appropriate discretion in managing the
affairs of corporations."0 As set forth above, the develop-
ments under Delaware law in the area of corporate takeovers,
particularly the enhanced scrutiny of defensive measures un-
der the Unocal standard, have led to an increased enforcement
of the duty of loyalty and not a decline as suggested by Profes-
sor Seligman. The procedural obstacles that Professor
Seligman views as impeding the protection of stockholders'
interests have had little or no practical effect on preventing
"o9 The statement by Professor Seligman that "as much as 71 percent of a re-
cent random sample of settlements of shareholder claims have apparently been
litigated under the federal securities laws, not state corporate law" provides no
empirical support for his unfounded conclusion that state corporate law enforce-
ment has declined. Seligman, supra note 1, at 36. Professor Seligman's hypothesis
is legally flawed because it incorrectly assumes that stockholders have a choice of
whether to bring substantive state law fiduciary duty breach claims or federal
securities law disclosure claims. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977). Further, Professor Seligman's hypothesis is flawed because it fails to recog-
nize that there are likely to be other reasons for the purported decline in corpo-
rate cases brought under state law, most notably the recent and dramatic decline
in takeovers and the marked increase in initial public offerings.
0 For example, in the 1980s, at the height of the takeover frenzy, many states
adopted statutes that were intended to thwart tender offers and openly advertised
such laws in order to attract corporations. In 1987, after extensive public hearings,
Delaware became the 37th state to adopt an anti-takeover statute when the Dela-
ware General Assembly adopted a business combination statute that has been
described by one commentator as the most even-handed of the genre. LEWIS S.
BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE (1993). Far from serving as a
"show stopper," the Delaware business combination statute provides incentives for
the fair economic treatment of stockholders. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991).
Given the high level of takeover activity that followed its enactment, it clearly did
not serve as a barrier to fairly-priced, non-coercive takeovers. Such a balanced
approach is typical of the studied development of Delaware statutory and case law.
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meritorious derivative actions from proceeding. Likewise, the
Van Gorkom decision has led to heightened awareness of, and
adherence to, the substantive duty of care.
While Professor Seligman refers to federal law becoming
the "new" corporate law, his thesis in advocating federal regu-
lation of state corporate law is anything but "new." There is
even less reason now than in the 1970s, when Professor
Seligman last called for federal preemption, for federal inter-
vention in an area traditionally governed exclusively by princi-
ples of state law. The reasons for rejecting federal preemption
in the area of state corporate law should be evident. First, the
increased administrative costs associated with federal preemp-
tion would be exorbitant, particularly at a time when the fed-
eral government is attempting to down-size in many areas in
order to reduce the federal budget deficit. Second, federal pre-
emption would inflict significant cost increases and case-load
burdens on an already over-burdened federal court system.
Moreover, federal preemption would severely detract from the
flexible nature of state corporation law and its ability to adapt
to new trends and to provide quick resolution of complex corpo-
rate law issues. For example, it is hard to imagine that the
diverse and overburdened federal court system could have
matched the performance of the Delaware courts in developing,
in only five short years, the comprehensive common law ema-
nating from the Unocal and Revlon lines of cases applicable to
directors' duties in responding to takeovers.
The so-called "race-to-the-bottom" theory upon which Pro-
fessor Seligman bases his call for federal preemption is non-
existent because state law, and particularly Delaware law,
must as a practical matter search for a middle ground. If Dela-
ware were to ignore the interests of stockholders, the State
would incur the risk of federal preemption advocated in Profes-
sor Seligman's article. On the other hand, a law that was per-
ceived as anti-management could well result in management
decisions to reincorporate elsewhere. Steering a course to avoid
both risks, Delaware has taken a solid middle ground and, as a
result, remains the premier state of incorporation in the Unit-
ed States; this is due to the flexible, yet well-defined, Delaware
General Corporation Law statute, numerous precedent-setting
cases, a flexible and well-trained Division of Corporations, and
the world-renowned court of chancery. Finally, Delaware con-
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tinues to set high standards for the enforcement of the fiducia-
ry duties of loyalty and care in order to protect the interests of
stockholders of Delaware corporations.
